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Different clinical studies have provided empirical evidence for impairments in cognitive
control in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD).The challenge arises, however,
when trying to specify the neurocognitive mechanisms behind the reported observations of
deviant patterns of goal-directed behavior in ASD. Studies trying to test specific assump-
tions by applying designs that are based on a more controlled experimental conditions
often fail in providing strong evidence for an impairment in specific cognitive functions. In
this review, we summarize and critically reflect on behavioral findings and their theoretical
explanations regarding cognitive control processing in autism, also from a developmental
perspective. The specific focus of this review is the recent evidence of deficits in inten-
tional control – a specific subset of cognitive control processes that biases the choice of
our behavioral goals – coming from different research fields. We relate this evidence to the
cognitive rigidity observed in ASD and argue that individuals with ASD experience prob-
lems at the intentional level rather than at the level of implementation of intentions. Both
these processes are related to cognitive control mechanisms but in different ways. Finally,
we discuss new directions in studying cognitive control in ASD and how these relate to
adaptive cognition.
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INTRODUCTION TO AUTISM
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by severe
disturbances in reciprocal social relations and varying degrees of
language and communication difficulties (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). In addition to these social and communication
problems, individuals with autism tend to exhibit a preference for
sameness, often reflected in behavioral patterns and interests that
are restricted and repetitive. In this paper we will focus on pos-
sible deficits in intentional control and relate these to the rigidity
observed in autism.
This pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) manifests at
early age, with a wide range in symptoms varying greatly across
age and abilities (McBride et al., 1996). To recognize this diversity,
the notion of autism spectrum has been proposed (Folstein and
Rosen-Scheidley, 2001), referring to both the extensive variety in
functional abilities across the affected individuals and to the set of
relatively heterogeneous disorders that make up the autism cate-
gory. Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) include Autistic Disorder,
Asperger’s Disorder, and PDD-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-
NOS). In fact, the autism spectrum has been expanded even
further by different clinical and experimental studies reporting
sub-clinical autistic symptomatology in family members of indi-
viduals with ASD (Eisenberg, 1957; Fombonne et al., 1997; Pickles
et al., 2000). The realization of the broader autism phenotype
(BAP) has motivated further experimental studies on parents and
siblings of children with ASD (Gerdts and Bernier, 2011) and a
large amount of studies with a genetic approach (for a recent
review on BAP, see Sucksmith et al., 2011).
It is not surprising then that grasping such a complex dis-
order as ASD through a general framework that describes the
neurocognitive impairments underlying ASD is an enormous chal-
lenge to the scientific community. Great efforts have been made so
far to understand ASD in terms of its expression in overt behav-
ior and brain structure and activity (see Belger et al., 2011; Stigler
et al., 2011; Just et al., 2012; Philip et al., 2012;, for recent reviews
on neuroimaging in autism), its biological origin, and the spe-
cific genetic and environmental factors that might be involved
(Eigsti and Shapiro, 2003; Geschwind, 2011). Different cognitive
theories have been proposed to account for certain aspects of
the observed behavioral symptoms. According to an increasingly
influential framework, some of the observed behavioral symptoms
in ASD – like for instance the often reported rigidity in behavior –
are generated by deficits in cognitive control (Russell, 1997; Hill,
2004a,b). The specific contribution of the current review is to
summarize behavioral findings and their theoretical explanations
regarding cognitive control processing in ASD and to critically
reflect on both. Although neuroimaging data are beyond the scope
of this review, we will refer to the most relevant (review) studies
from neuroscience throughout the text. After a brief introduc-
tion on cognitive control mechanisms, we will review the relevant
clinical and experimental literature from the research field on task
switching, and on intentions and actions in ASD. We will in partic-
ular examine the recent evidence of deficits in intentional control
coming from different research fields and relate this evidence to
the rigidity observed in ASD. We refer to intentional control as
a specific subset of cognitive control processes that biases the
choice of our behavioral goals and hence further facilitates selec-
tion and monitoring of goal-directed actions (cf. Mayr and Bell,
2006; Butler et al., 2011). We will also reflect on findings about
cognitive control mechanisms across different age groups. Finally,
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we will discuss new directions in studying cognitive control in ASD
and their relation to adaptive cognition.
COGNITIVE CONTROL IN ASD
WHAT IS COGNITIVE CONTROL?
Understanding how people guide their thoughts and actions is a
long-standing challenge in psychology and neuroscience. Being
able to behave in accordance with current intentions is suggested
to depend on dedicated neurocognitive control mechanisms (Nor-
man and Shallice, 1986; Miller and Cohen, 2001). These control
mechanisms allow us to sustain focus on the information rele-
vant to the behavioral goal we wish to achieve while competing
with possible distractions, and to change focus when required.
In other words, cognitive control allows for goal-directed and
flexible behavior in a dynamically changing environment. When
this top-down control fails – due to some temporary distraction
or a permanent deficit – behavior is expected to be governed
by habitual or recently activated pathways. Even with top-down
input, performance is expected to be less efficient if our current
behavioral goals conflict with habitual patterns of behavior.
Processes involved in cognitive control have often been investi-
gated experimentally by asking people to switch between different
cognitive tasks (Sakai, 2008; Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck
et al., 2010). Participants would for instance be required to switch
between responding to the color and responding to the shape of
geometric figures. In these well-established task switching para-
digms, tasks are mostly specified by a task cue provided on each
experimental trial or by predefined task orders. The large amount
of studies conducted within this research field has provided empir-
ical evidence that people are indeed able to switch quickly and
flexibly from one task to another. People, however, experience
cognitive limitations while doing so: they slow down and make
more errors when switching (Allport et al., 1994; Rogers and Mon-
sell, 1995; Meiran, 1996; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Surprisingly, this
switch cost is reduced but not abolished when providing ample
time to prepare for the required switch (Rogers and Monsell,
1995; Meiran, 2000; Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; Poljac et al., 2006).
The ability to switch tasks as well as the reduction of switch
costs with ample preparation time are typically taken as a clear
expression of top-down intentional control, whereas the residual
cost is attributed to different bottom-up effects disrupting goal-
directed behavior. So far, a broad consensus has been reached that
performance in instructed task switching experiments reflects a
complex interaction between top-down control and bottom-up
interference (Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010).
Besides task switching, updating of working memory contents
and inhibition of interfering information have also usually been
identified as important contributors to the control of thought and
action (Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake and Friedman, 2012; for neu-
roimaging findings, see Berkman et al., 2012). Updating refers to
the ability to monitor incoming information and to adjust the
content of working memory according to the current behavioral
goal. Inhibition, on the other hand, is often proposed as a process
that resolves interference from competing thoughts and actions
(Friedman and Miyake, 2004), and as such allows for appropriate
decision making (for a different view on action control, see e.g.,
Allport, 1987). Inhibitory control is a strongly debated topic in
the literature. The debate goes, for instance, from questions about
the meaning of the concept in the study of cognition and neuro-
science (MacLeod, 2007) to how unitary the concept is (Friedman
and Miyake, 2004; Munakata et al., 2011) and what its functional
role might be in serial-task control (Mayr, 2009; Koch et al., 2010)
or memory (Levy and Anderson, 2002). Inhibition as an active
and quick cognitive process is suggested to be closely related to
interference (Friedman and Miyake, 2004), but so is passive and
more persistent decay of activation (Altmann and Schunn, 2012).
Although the exact functional role of inhibition and its rela-
tion to interference, decay, and cognitive control needs to be
more clearly specified, the existence of inhibition and its modu-
lation of behavior has been shown empirically by various studies.
These studies usually apply fairly simple cognitive tasks – such as
Go/No Go and stop-signal tasks – developed to assess inhibitory
processes, typically focusing on response inhibition (Logan, 1994).
The participant is for instance required to quickly respond to some
stimulus material (e.g., pressing a button when seeing the letters
Q, P, T) but to inhibit responding either to specific stimulus (e.g.,
to the letter X) or when hearing auditory input (e.g., when a beep
is sounded). Behavioral index of inhibitory control is the num-
ber of errors made or the time it takes to stop responding (see
Aron, 2007 for a review on neuroscience findings). Similar to tasks
investing inhibitory control, different experimental tasks are devel-
oped for investigating the updating ability, such as for instance,
the letter memory and the n-back tasks. In the letter memory
task, participants are required to remember the last four letters
of a series of sequentially presented letters and to rehears them
out loud throughout the task. In the n-back task, participants
would typically be asked to indicate whether each stimulus in a
sequence matches the one that appeared on n trials before. Behav-
ioral index of updating in these tasks is the number of letters
recalled incorrectly or trials with incorrectly indicated stimulus
dimension match, and the speed with which the latter is done (for
a recent study on neural correlates of updating, see Nee and Brown,
2012).
EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION APPROACH IN ASD
Investigating cognitive processes that allow for goal-directed
behavior in clinical populations and hence individuals with ASD
is often done by focusing on executive functions. These cogni-
tive functions relate to the higher-order neurocognitive control
processes and encompass for instance initiation and monitor-
ing of actions, mental flexibility, planning, working memory,
impulse control, and inhibition (Rabbitt, 1997a; Roberts et al.,
1998; Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss and Knight, 2002). Executive func-
tions have traditionally been linked to frontal lobes (Miller and
D’Esposito, 2005; Seniów, 2012), although this relation is not
necessarily a direct one (Alvarez and Emory, 2006). Moreover,
involvement of the parietal cortex (Stoet and Snyder, 2009; De
Baene et al., 2012) and other brain areas has recently become evi-
dent (see Funahashi, 2001; Jurado and Rosselli, 2007 for a review),
suggesting a more distributed nature of the neural correlates of
executive functions.
Deficits in executive functions have been associated with some
of the everyday social behaviors seen in individuals with ASD
(Ozonoff et al., 1991; Happé et al., 2006). Interestingly, White
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(2012) has recently proposed that poor performance measured
in individuals with ASD on tasks developed to assess execu-
tive functions originates from difficulties they experience with
understanding the experimenter’s expectations for these often
ambiguously defined tasks rather than from their executive dys-
function. According to White, deviant scores on these tasks are
best understood as a reflection of difficulties in forming an
implicit understanding of expectations of others and problems
with taking another’s perspective, assumed to be the case in
ASD (see Boucher, 2012 for a recent critical review). Executive
dysfunction is, however, mostly related to non-social behaviors
in ASD, such as a need for sameness, a strong tendency for
repetitive behaviors, lack of impulse control, and difficulties in
switching between tasks (Hill, 2004a,b; Rajendran and Mitchell,
2007; for frontal lobes abnormalities in ASD, see Schmitz et al.,
2007).
Usually deficits in executive functions are detected by means
of different neuropsychological tests. Various studies using these
tests have reported different executive impairments in ASD, such
as deficits in planning (Hughes et al., 1994; Ozonoff and McEvoy,
1994; Hughes, 1996; Ozonoff and Jensen, 1999; Geurts et al., 2004;
Ozonoff et al., 2004; Hill and Bird, 2006), the inability to gener-
ate novel ideas and behaviors spontaneously (Boucher, 1988; Craig
and Baron-Cohen, 1990; Turner, 1999; Wong et al., 2003), selective
inhibitory impairments (Christ et al., 2007, 2011; Adams and Jar-
rold,2012), and problems with cognitive flexibility (Ozonoff,1997;
Shu et al., 2001; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Zelazo, 2006). For instance,
difficulties with planning in individuals with ASD become evident
when being tested on a task commonly used to assess planning and
problem solving skills in patients – the Tower of London (ToL) task
(Ozonoff and McEvoy, 1994; Robinson et al., 2009). In this task,
participants are presented with a prearranged sequence of different
colored beads on different sized pegs. They are required to move
the beads such to match a predetermined goal state shown on a
parallel board of pegs determined by the examiner. The instruc-
tion given is to do so in as few moves as possible, while obeying
some prespecified rules. Robinson and colleagues demonstrated
that children with ASD needed more moves to solve these prob-
lems and that they violated the rules of the task more often than
typically developing children (see Just et al., 2007 for the neural
bases of the deviant performance on ToL in ASD). In the same
study, the authors observed furthermore difficulties with inhibi-
tion of proponent responses (for neuroimaging data, see Kana
et al., 2007). The task used was a computerized version of the
Stroop task, with color words printed in different color ink. Chil-
dren were required to indicate the color of the ink that the word
was written in. The findings demonstrated that children with ASD
were poorer in responding to items in which the color indicated
by the word did not match the ink in which the word was writ-
ten (e.g., word “green” printed in blue ink). Altogether, different
studies have demonstrated deficits in executive function in indi-
viduals with ASD at the behavioral level (for neural correlates, see
e.g., Schmitz et al., 2006). Interestingly, empirical evidence has also
been provided for executive dysfunction in parents (Hughes et al.,
1997) and siblings (Hughes et al., 1999) of children with ASD but
not in the BAP (Maes et al., 2012).
CHALLENGES WITH THE EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION APPROACH
It is evident that the proposed idea of executive dysfunction in ASD
has received empirical support from different studies. The diffi-
culty arises,however,when we try to provide a comprehensible the-
oretical explanation identifying the neurocognitive mechanisms
for the observed empirical findings. First, the idea of executive
dysfunction requires further specification in order to be infor-
mative and functional for diagnosis, intervention, and theoretical
understanding (see Jurado and Rosselli, 2007 for a comprehensive
review on executive functions). More precisely, considering the
fact that executive functions cover different control mechanisms,
a theory in terms of executive dysfunction might apply to almost
any neuropsychological disorder without being specifically related
to autism. For instance, difficulties in executive functions have also
been debated and proposed as a candidate for being a core feature
of Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome (GTS, Eddy et al., 2012), atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Willcutt et al., 2005;
Brown, 2006; Antshel et al., 2010), schizophrenia (Freedman and
Brown, 2011), Parkinson’s disease (PD; Cameron et al., 2012) and
other neurodevelopmental disorders. If these various disorders
were indeed all based on executive dysfunction, one would expect
then that they must share most of their underlying neurocognitive
mechanisms. Yet we all agree that these neurodevelopmental dis-
orders differ substantially enough from each other to treat them as
being separate disorders. In fact, executive function deficits are not
the single necessary and sufficient cause of any of these disorders.
So, the danger behind applying such a broad theoretical concept as
the core feature of disorders lies in the possibility of false impres-
sion that different neuropsychological disorders stem from similar
neurocognitive deficits by simply placing these deficits under the
same executive functions umbrella.
Second challenge relates more to the measures applied in stud-
ies testing executive functions in ASD. Mostly, these are complex
neuropsychological tests that put high demands on different cog-
nitive capacities. Clearly, these tests are sensitive enough to detect
existing deviations in behavioral patterns in individuals with ASD
as compared to typically developing individuals or to some other
clinical populations. The complexity of these tests, however, makes
it difficult to interpret any observed differences in behavior in
a straightforward and intelligible way. The solution, one might
think, would be to either break down the commonly used tests to
less complex components of executive functions or to isolate the
component of interest by making it the only varying factor in the
test. The question that arises then is how much of an “executive”
is left in such a controlled situation (cf. Burgess, 1997; Rabbitt,
1997b; Brown, 2006). This might perhaps explain why executive
abilities in daily life of individuals with ASD as rated by their
close relatives and trainers are not inevitably consistent with exec-
utive abilities measured by neuropsychological tests (e.g., Chaytor
et al., 2006; Teunisse et al., 2012). Furthermore, if the scores on
tests developed to assess executive functions reflect the working of
the neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for executive abilities,
then training people on these tasks should not only improve their
performance on the specific task but also on most of other exec-
utive tasks, as well as improving how they handle daily activities.
This is, however, mostly not the case: trainings seem to produce
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very specific, short-term effects on the trained task, without trans-
fer of trained skills to the situations outside the training context
or long-term retention (Melby-Lervåg and Hulme, 2012).
Recently, Geurts et al. (2009) have addressed a related issue
focusing on cognitive flexibility in autism. Cognitive flexibility
refers to the ability or a property of the cognitive system to
dynamically activate and modify cognitive processes in response
to changing task demands and context factors (Deák, 2003; Mon-
sell, 2003; Ionescu, 2012). In their review, Geurts and colleagues
give a critical examination of the existing disparity between the
strong belief of the clinicians and researchers that cognitive inflex-
ibility (i.e., rigidity) is central to ASD on the one hand, and
the lack of consistent unambiguous empirical evidence for this
belief on the other. The idea of cognitive inflexibility in ASD has
been put forward for at least two different reasons – individuals
with ASD exhibit rigid and repetitive behaviors in daily lives, and
neuropsychological tests that are developed to scan global indi-
vidual capacity in mental flexibility have indicated differences in
behavioral patterns between typically developing and individuals
with ASD. For instance, neuropsychological tests like the Intradi-
mensional/Extradimensional (ID/ED) shift task of the Cambridge
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; Ozonoff
et al., 2004) or the Dimensional Change Card Sort (Zelazo, 2006)
have been used to detect differences in cognitive flexibility. The
ID/ED task consists of shifts within one stimulus dimension (ID)
and between different stimulus dimensions (ED), with the latter
considered to reflect cognitive flexibility the most. When assessed
in individuals with ASD, the outcomes vary in showing deficits on
this task: while some studies have indeed reported impairments
in ASD on the ED component (Ozonoff et al., 2004; Yerys et al.,
2009; but, see Landa and Goldberg, 2005), the majority of studies
find no group differences (Edgin and Pennington, 2005; Goldberg
et al., 2005; Happé et al., 2006; Corbett et al., 2009). The test that
has most clearly indicated cognitive inflexibility in ASD is the Wis-
consin Card Sorting Test (WCST). Many studies using the WCST
have shown differences in behavioral patterns between individuals
with ASD and their controls (Hill, 2004a,b; Geurts et al., 2009).
Wisconsin card sorting test is a neuropsychological test, in
which different cards need to be sorted on one of three possi-
ble dimensions (color, number, or shape). The currently correct
dimension is not explicitly announced and changes according to a
fixed number of trials. The participant receives feedback when the
card is placed incorrectly. Based on this feedback, the participant
needs to make a decision whether to continue or to change their
sorting rule. The performance on WCST is measured in terms of
errors, and individuals with ASD tend to make more perseverative
errors compared to typically developing individuals (Goldstein
et al., 2001; Geurts et al., 2004; Lopez et al., 2005; Tsuchiya et al.,
2005; Verté et al., 2005, 2006). These errors are seen as a fail-
ure to shift to the new sorting rule and, therefore, as an index of
cognitive inflexibility. Accordingly, the major conclusion drawn
from these studies is that the tendency for highly perseverative
responses to the WCST observed in individuals with ASD reflects
their problems with changing the focus, switching the tasks, and
hence difficulties in cognitive flexibility.
Intriguingly, however, when tested in a more controlled exper-
imental settings, this idea of deficits in cognitive flexibility as
measured by deviant task switching performance is hardly sup-
ported by any empirical evidence (Stahl and Pry, 2002; Schmitz
et al., 2006; Whitehouse et al., 2006; Shafritz et al., 2008; Dichter
et al., 2010; Poljac et al., 2010; Hayward et al., 2012). For instance,
Hayward and colleagues used stimuli that included global shapes
(diamonds, squares, circles) that were made up of smaller ele-
ments of the same shapes. This combination of global and local
elements allowed the authors to test performance flexibility in a
group of high-functioning young adults with ASD and in their
controls. Flexibility was measured as a difference in performance
(speed and accuracy) between two conditions: the condition in
which participants responded either to the global or to the local
level of the stimulus element with the condition that included
switching between the two levels. The authors observed similar
patterns of behavior regarding flexibility between the two groups
and hence no empirical evidence for deviant flexibility in individu-
als with ASD. A comparable finding was observed in children and
adolescents with ASD in experimental conditions that required
them to switch between tasks that were explicitly specified (Dichter
et al., 2010; Poljac et al., 2010). These observations of no deviant
flexibility in ASD reported in studies using more experimentally
controlled tasks are in sharp contrast to clinical studies and reports
on daily lives of individuals with ASD. As already pointed out
by Geurts et al. (2009), this discrepancy between the observed
behavioral rigidity and the lack of empirical support for cognitive
inflexibility raises the question of how to resolve this paradox. The
authors propose four different points to take into account when
trying to specify the cognitive mechanisms behind the behavioral
inflexibility in ASD. First, to help us address the comorbidity
often present in ASD and specify the differences and similari-
ties between ASD and other neurodevelopmental disorders, the
studies would need to be designed such that the behavior of the
individuals with ASD is compared not only to a typically devel-
oping comparison group but also to comparison groups involving
other neurodevelopmental disorders. Second, studies with larger
sample size would also be desirable to validate the non-significant
group differences reported in studies with small sample size. Third,
the authors suggest the use of mechanistic and detailed measures
that are theory based – to help us specify the cognitive deficits in
ASD – as well as the use of ecologically valid measures – to help us
link the actual behavior to task performance. Finally, the authors
suggest that other top-down (social-motivational) and bottom-
up (arousal and stress) factors than discussed so far also need to
be considered when trying to explain inflexibility in ASD. Other
studies on cognitive control – usually involving typically devel-
oping individuals – have already shown that both top-down and
bottom-up factors strongly determine our goal-directed behavior
(Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010).
GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR AND COGNITIVE CONTROL IN ASD
Goal-directed behavior has been investigated within differ-
ent research fields, such as those investigating task switch-
ing and action control. These studies typically reflect scien-
tific attempts to understand neurocognitive control mechanism
behind goal-directed behavior, both in terms of the formation of
higher-order task intentions as well as in terms of their implemen-
tation and specific translation to thought and action. Intentions
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can be defined as tendencies that guide our interaction with the
environment and can be specified at different levels (Ondobaka
et al., 2012). Although the categorization of the levels might differ
between research fields, we could for instance define intentions at
higher-order goal level (e.g., quench the thirst) as well as at the
action (e.g., drink some water) and the motor level (e.g., grab a
glass of water; for an interesting discussion on this topic, see Uithol
et al., 2012).
As we know from different lesion studies, this ability to exert
intentional control is not self evident (Aron et al., 2004). Also
some empirical evidence for difficulties in intentional control have
been reported in clinical populations, like for instance delayed
experience of intention in GTS (Moretto et al., 2011) or the imbal-
anced relation between voluntary and automated modes of control
in PD (Torres et al., 2011). Furthermore, deficits in intentional
resistance to interference have been reported in individuals with
schizophrenia (Paulik et al., 2009). The processes involved in inten-
tional resistance to interference that is introduced in experimental
settings by presenting task irrelevant information simultaneously
with the task relevant information relates to the ability of the cog-
nitive system to protect the current task execution. Intentional
resistance to interference differs from proactive type of interfer-
ence that arises from previously relevant task information – the
process that is not directly related to intentional control – but
resembles strongly the processes of intentional inhibition that has
been reported to be impaired in individuals with ADHD (Roberts
et al., 2011) and also in children with ASD (Christ et al., 2011).
In individuals with ASD, just a few studies have been conducted
so far that investigated their intentional control, for which task
switching procedures were applied (Schmitz et al., 2006; White-
house et al., 2006, Experiment 3; Poljac et al., 2010). The rationale
behind studying intentions with rapid task switching procedures
is the assumption that our ability to perform instructed tasks is
a clear expression of intentional control. These studies have not
provided any indication of a deviant task switching behavior in
ASD or problems with intentional control. From the studies on
action control, however, some empirical evidence has been pro-
vided for problems at the level of translation of intentions into
actions (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Boria et al., 2009). Cattaneo and
colleagues have for instance shown that children with ASD show a
deficit in predicting the final goal of an action sequence based on
the initial or antecedent motor act. Despite the fact that instructed
task switching studies so far indicate no clear deficits in intentional
control, and a few studies on action control indicate the problems
at the level of translation of intentions into actions, we will try and
elaborate more on the possibility of deficits in intentional con-
trol in ASD. This idea is especially interesting to consider given
the usually reported inability of individuals with ASD to gen-
erate novel ideas and behaviors spontaneously (Boucher, 1988;
Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1990; Turner, 1999; Wong et al., 2003)
and difficulties with shared intentionality (cf. Tomasello et al.,
2005).
INTENTIONAL AND MOTOR CONTROL IN ASD
INSTRUCTED AND VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING STUDIES
Being able to direct our thoughts and actions allows us to adap-
tively respond to changes in internal and external conditions.
Clearly, intentional control provides the basis for cognitive flexi-
bility. Interestingly, however, recent studies on task switching have
reported empirical evidence for a small but consistent preference
for repetitive voluntary behavior in typically developing individu-
als. Specifically, when given an option to choose between two tasks
and deliberately decide which task to perform in each trial, typi-
cally developing individuals show a tendency to repeat tasks more
often than to switch between them (Arrington and Logan, 2004;
Mayr and Bell, 2006). This repetition bias occurs even though peo-
ple are explicitly instructed to choose tasks at random and equally
often.
Voluntary task switching procedures are developed to address
the issue of task intentionality in procedures in which the tasks
are cued – externally defined – in each trial (Arrington and Logan,
2004, 2005). More precisely, the question has been raised as to
how much of intentional control one needs to exert if the tasks are
(pre)specified. Certainly, these instructed procedures offer much
more controlled way of testing cognitive control than complex
neurocognitive tests, such as the WCST. However, we also know
from different studies that task switching behavior is strongly
affected by task history. This observation is usually explained in
terms of bottom-up effects. Specifically, a carry-over of activa-
tion from previous tasks is suggested to modulate the execution
of the current task (Allport et al., 1994; Sohn and Carlson, 2000;
Wylie and Allport, 2000; Ruthruff et al., 2001; Monsell, 2003). It
is therefore possible that when task execution is based on explic-
itly given task instructions, the processes involved reflect some
other control mechanisms than those involved in intentional con-
trol. For instance, behavior measured in these conditions might
reflect processes needed to resolve proactive interference from pre-
vious tasks rather than reflecting any kind of intentionality. This
possibility is in particular interesting for understanding cognitive
control mechanisms in ASD, since Christ et al. (2011) have recently
shown that children with ASD demonstrated no difficulties with
resolving proactive interference.
In voluntary task switching procedures, the intentional compo-
nent is separated from the subsequent action: Whereas the choice
of tasks is assumed to reflect intentional control, the subsequent
task execution would reflect the translation of intentions into the
corresponding actions. Separating task choice from task execution
allows us to disentangle the participants’ global task intentions
from their specific actions. Different studies have provided evi-
dence that these two reflect related yet dissociable processes (Mayr
and Bell, 2006; Lien and Ruthruff, 2008; Arrington and Yates, 2009;
Yeung, 2010; Butler et al., 2011; Orr and Weissman, 2011; Poljac
et al., 2012). Specifically, while we know that task choice and task
execution are sensitive to similar influences (Lien and Ruthruff,
2008;Yeung, 2010; Orr and Weissman, 2011), we also know that the
expression of the behavioral costs related to task choice and those
related to task execution differ. This difference becomes perhaps
most clearly evident when using tasks that differ in their relative
strength: While it takes longer to make a choice to switch to the
more difficult task, performance costs are larger when switching
to the easier task (Millington et al., in revision). Another interest-
ing finding related to differences in relative task difficulty is that it
modulates people’s tendency to repeat tasks such that people tend
to exhibit a stronger repetition bias for the relatively harder task.
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Voluntary task switching has recently been investigated in typ-
ically developing participants with either a high or a low level of
autistic traits (Poljac et al., 2012). Autistic traits were assessed by a
self-report questionnaire that quantifies the extent of autistic traits
in healthy population – the Autism spectrum Quotient (AQ). The
AQ has been used extensively to investigate the BAP with converg-
ing evidence that autism is not just a spectrum within the clinical
population, but that autistic traits are continuously distributed
through the general population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Hoek-
stra et al., 2007). As often in studies using voluntary procedures,
Poljac and colleagues required the participants to switch voluntar-
ily between two tasks, while encouraging them to choose the tasks
at random and equally often. In each trial, participants first indi-
cated to have made a choice between a relatively easy location and
a relatively hard shape classification task by pressing a space bar.
After having made a task choice, they then responded to the subse-
quently presented stimulus. Consistent with previous studies with
instructed task procedures in ASD (Schmitz et al., 2006; White-
house et al., 2006; Poljac et al., 2010), no difference was observed
between the high and the low AQ participants in the behavioral
patterns of task execution. The authors reported that both groups
replicated in a similar way earlier findings regarding task execution
reported in studies using voluntary task procedures by exhibit-
ing reliable switch costs (Arrington and Logan, 2004) and reliable
asymmetry in switch costs (Yeung, 2010). Importantly, however,
significant differences in task choice were observed between the two
groups: The asymmetry in repetition bias – typically observed in
healthy individuals – was pronounced more strongly in individu-
als with high AQ scores, as they showed a higher tendency to repeat
the harder task more often than the individuals with low AQ scores.
These findings of similarities in task execution but differences in
task choice between the two groups seem to suggest that repetitive
behavior in ASD is possibly associated with processes involved in
the formation of general task intentions rather than with processes
involved in implementation of these intentions and their transla-
tion to the corresponding actions. While the study clearly provides
first indication of deviant intentional control but intact control of
task execution in ASD, this idea needs to be tested further in the
clinical population. This might help us specifying the mechanism
behind the observed repetitive behaviors and possibly also behind
the cognitive inflexibility in ASD.
ACTION CONTROL AND ANTICIPATING INTENTIONS OF OTHERS
Investigating how people control their actions while interacting
with the world in a goal-directed manner has provided empirical
evidence that people strongly rely on sensory information for mak-
ing predictions of events in the environment. In fact, it has been
suggested that learning to make new movements goes together
with building of associations in our brain between actions and
sensory feedback. This allows us to predict the sensory conse-
quences of self-generated action and to maximize performance in
a given environment (Izawa et al., 2008). This close link between
action and perception is for instance supported by findings that
people tend to move their eyes toward the object that they want to
act upon in advance of their actual movement (Ballard et al., 1995;
Epelboim et al., 1995; Land et al., 1999; Johansson et al., 2001; Sailer
et al., 2005). It seems that these anticipatory eye movements aid the
control of goal-directed behavior when visual input is available.
Interestingly, observing others performing actions elicits similar
eye movement patterns to those elicited when people execute the
actions themselves both in adults (Flanagan and Johansson, 2003;
Rotman et al., 2006) and in infants (van Elk et al., 2008; Rosander
and von Hofsten, 2011). Action execution and action observa-
tion seem also to elicit activation of neurons in specific and to
some extent overlapping brain areas (di Pellegrino et al., 1992;
Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). These mirror neurons
were originally discovered in the ventral premotor cortex of the
macaque monkey (area F5). In humans, a similar circuit has also
been discovered, involving parieto-frontal network (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). It has been suggested that the functional role of
the mirror neurons is to encode motor acts and movements, sub-
serving the understanding of the motor intention underlying the
actions of others, without providing information about the rea-
sons why a certain action takes place (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2010; for a critical note, see Hickok, 2009).
Investigation of motor learning and action control in ASD has
recently provided evidence that children with ASD rely stronger
than normal on proprioceptive feedback when learning new move-
ments (Haswell et al., 2009; Izawa et al., 2012). This observation is
important as it suggests abnormalities in the processes underlying
the formation of perception-action associations in ASD. The abil-
ity to predict the sensory consequences of self-generated action
is crucial for optimizing our goal-directed behavior. Accord-
ing to Friston (2010), for instance, people optimize their goal-
directed behavior using sensory inputs such that they maximize
the expected rewards and minimize the expected costs. Deviations
in this predictive mechanism would be reflected in performance
on tasks requiring goal-directed actions. Consistent with this idea,
empirical evidence has been provided for deficits in predicting
the final goal of a complex action in children and adults with
ASD (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Zalla et al., 2010a). For instance, when
required to reach and grasp a piece of food and bring it to the
mouth, children with autism showed different pattern of food
anticipation as measured by the activation of the mylohyoideus
muscle (MH). Specifically, Cattaneo and colleagues showed that
while the MH activation increased in typically developing chil-
dren much before their hand grasped the food, the MH activation
in children with ASD did not increase before the last step of the
complex action, that is, not before they started moving the hand
holding the piece of food toward the mouth. Boria et al. (2009)
further specified this deficit in action prediction by providing evi-
dence that rather than having problems with predicting the action
itself (what is done), children with ASD found it difficult to predict
the intention behind the action (why is it done). Furthermore, it
seems that children with autism have a deficit in integrating motor
acts into a global action (Fabbri-Destro et al., 2009). Related to
these observations of deficits at the level of motor learning and
action control (for structural brain deviations, see Mostofsky et al.,
2007), different studies have proposed that individuals with ASD
experience problems with understanding the action intentions of
others due to mirror neurons (Cossu et al., 2012; for a review see
Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). These neurological deviations in the
parieto-frontal mirror neuron circuit are considered to be at the
basis of their problems in social interactions (Ramachandran and
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Oberman, 2006; Oberman and Ramachandran, 2007), although
some scientists challenge this view (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008;
Hamilton, 2009).
Another interesting point to address here is that most of the
studies testing action control and intentions in ASD so far, have
applied repeated presentation of the same stimulus material over
short period of time, often with meaningless and simple actions.
Using meaningful multistep actions and dynamical stimulus mate-
rial instead (auditory stream and video material; cf. Carmi and Itti,
2006) would make it possible to measure anticipatory eye move-
ments in an experimental paradigm that better represents how
people usually interact with the real world. Such a paradigm would
allow for differentiating between single action steps and the final
step (goal) of an action sequence. Recently empirical evidence has
been provided that anticipatory eye movements in typically devel-
oping individuals are elevated for the last and the final step in
action sequences consisting of three action steps (Poljac et al., in
revision). The action sequences were applied in two different but
highly comparable paradigms – one relying more on action con-
trol and the other on language comprehension. Interestingly, this
pattern of increased amount of predictive looks for the final action
step was similar for both the action and the language paradigms.
These observations imply that anticipatory eye movements reflect
the working of a shared predictive mechanism that accumulates
semantic information relevant for our final (motor or linguistic)
behavioral goal in complex action sequences.
Interactions with the world, and in particular those involving
other people, would clearly lack fluency without such a predictive
mechanism. It facilitates our understanding of a given situation,
allowing for efficient and adaptive interaction with the environ-
ment. Even social interactions that at surface look easy – walking
next to each other or having a conversation – would be quite diffi-
cult to perform fluently and timely if our brain would exclusively
rely on slow feedback information processing. Obviously, for a
joint (motor or linguistic) activity to be successful, interpreting
each other’s actions or words after they occur would not be suffi-
cient. Considering the fact that one of the core symptoms of ASD is
their problems in social interactions and communication, it would
be quite interesting to test if individuals with ASD would demon-
strate the accumulation of the predictive looks in the final step of
complex action sequences, both in the action and in the language
paradigm. If the predictive mechanism is generally impaired in
ASD, then the level of predictive looks would be expected to be
overall lower in individuals with ASD than in typically developing
individuals. If, however, the predictive mechanism is impaired due
to deficits related to intentional control, then one would expect to
observe around an equal amount of predictive looks across the
whole action sequence without an increase in anticipatory eye
movements in the final step.
Interestingly, also in the domain of action control and inten-
tions, the observed difficulty with predicting – in this case the
anticipatory postural adjustments (Schmitz et al., 2003; Vernazza-
Martin et al., 2005) – seems to be predominantly present for
actions with voluntary movement onsets, rather than in condi-
tions when the onset was imposed (Martineau et al., 2004). This
finding is remarkable as it is in line with the suggestion from the
task switching studies that not the instructed (Schmitz et al., 2006;
Whitehouse et al., 2006; Geurts et al., 2009; Poljac et al., 2010) but
the voluntary type of task switching (Poljac et al., 2012) seems to
be difficult for individuals with ASD. We will further discuss this
observation in the context of a recently proposed idea of open and
closed systems (Lawson, 2003; Lawson et al., 2004) in the following
section.
COGNITIVE CONTROL IN OPEN AND CLOSED TASKS
Investigation of the intentional control mechanisms in ASD within
both cognitive flexibility (task switching studies) and action con-
trol (perception-action studies) have provided empirical indi-
cations that problems predominantly arise in tasks of an open
character rather than in tasks that are more strictly defined. Indi-
viduals with ASD seem to be able to follow the instructions and
flexibly switch between tasks when tasks are clearly specified but
not when the tasks leave space for interpretation (cf. Klin et al.,
2003; Geurts et al., 2009). Indication for particular problems with
voluntary task choices (Poljac et al., 2012) supports this notion and
suggests problems at the intentional level rather than at the level of
the implementation of intentions. In a similar fashion, evidence
coming from action control suggests deficits at the intentional
level (Boria et al., 2009) and in particular for those situations that
involve voluntary action control (Martineau et al., 2004).
Interestingly, also in language and memory, empirical evidence
has been provided for this distinction between mostly problematic
voluntary (user driven) control and usually unimpaired instructed
(stimulus driven) control. For instance, children with ASD experi-
ence difficulties in mapping novel words onto unnamed entities if
they need to rely on speakers’ referential intentions (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1997), but not if the amount of objects without a name is
restricted (Preissler and Carey, 2005). This restriction of objects
when mapping new words to novel objects in the world helps
young children with ASD to learn meanings of new words equally
successfully as healthy controls. Also, studies examining memory
functioning in ASD (see Goh and Peterson, 2012 for a recent review
on neuroimaging findings on learning an memory deficits in ASD)
showed that, while paradigms testing cued-recall of words tend to
demonstrate no deviant performance (Bowler et al., 1997), free
recall paradigms generally lead to diminished performance in this
population (Smith et al., 2007; Gaigg et al., 2008). Also when tested
for free recall of actions, individuals with ASD differ from typi-
cally developing individuals as they seem not to benefit from the
enactment effect, that is, the memory enhancement for enacted
compared to observed actions (Zalla et al., 2010b). Furthermore,
children with ASD find it difficult to memorize task rules based
on arbitrary (learned in the lab) stimulus-response (S-R) asso-
ciations but not memorizing task rules based on straightforward
(learned outside the lab) S-R associations (Stoet and López, 2001).
Accordingly, adults with ASD experience difficulties with novelty
processing of stimulus material (Maes et al., 2011). All these obser-
vations are in line with the challenges that individuals with ASD
experience when generating novel ideas and behaviors sponta-
neously (Boucher, 1988; Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1990; Turner,
1999; Wong et al., 2003). An interesting idea has been proposed to
explain the difference in task success between tasks that are loosely
defined and those that are strictly defined in their demands – indi-
viduals with ASD would- according to this view have difficulties
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with “open” type of systems (Klin et al., 2003; Lawson, 2003;
Lawson et al., 2004; White et al., 2009).
OPEN AND CLOSED SYSTEMS
Real-life situations typically involve huge variety in options for
our interactions with the environment and with other people.
Handling these situations optimally often requires highly adaptive
human behavior. One could say that our everyday interactions
with the world with many (if not endless) degrees of freedom
involve a system that is open in how a specific situation will even-
tually be solved by an individual. An open system is the one that
cannot be reduced to one predefined solution of a given situation.
Closed systems, on the contrary, are those for which we know the
exact output given a certain input (Bhaskar, 1978; Winograd and
Flores, 1986; Klin et al., 2003; Lawson, 2003; Lawson et al., 2004).
OPEN AND CLOSED TASKS IN ASD
Typically developing individuals experience the world as an open
system with unpredictable relations between the events, reflecting
a fairly accurate view of the actual world. Individuals with ASD, on
the contrary, experience their environment with all its elements as
a closed system. Such an attitude toward world consists of definite
and predictable event regularities. Accordingly, this mode of think-
ing disregards irregularities, the complexity and unpredictability
of situations. Such a conception would generate difficulties in cop-
ing with dynamics of daily life possibly reflected in behavior as
repetitive and rigid responding to the environment. Similarly, this
cognitive style would generate difficulties in coping with experi-
mental tasks that are more ecologically valid, that is, those tasks
that better reflect real-life situations (Klin et al., 2003; Kenworthy
et al., 2008). Therefore, neuropsychological tests and experimen-
tal tasks that are more complex, such as WCST and voluntary
task switching procedures, would be more sensitive to detect these
differences in cognitive styles (White et al., 2009).
This rather descriptive explanation for the observed discrepan-
cies between the behavior inside and outside the lab is valuable
as it provides a framework for further investigation of different
inconsistencies (Geurts et al., 2009; Teunisse et al., 2012) in find-
ings on cognitive control in ASD within different research areas.
It would be interesting to see if we can specify the neurocognitive
mechanism behind the differences in behavioral patterns observed
between open and closed tasks. More precisely, it would be infor-
mative to test if the processes that generate these differences could
be specified by leveraging our knowledge on intentional control
difficulties in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Martineau et al.,
2004; Boria et al., 2009; Poljac et al., 2012). For instance, one
could directly test whether these differences in cognitive styles
as described in terms of predictability of event regularities (open
vs. closed systems) are predictive of someone’s ability in inten-
tional control. An interesting note to this part is that Klin et al.
(2003) have for instance already used this intriguing observation
of discrepancies in behavior in clearly instructed and more natural
situations as a starting point to explain difficulties that individuals
with ASD experience in social interactions. The authors put for-
ward an idea that human cognition is embedded in experiences
resulting from a body’s actions upon salient aspects of its sur-
rounding environment. The way this occurs in ASD differs from
early on in the development, starting with differences in predis-
position for stimulus saliency. Because of this, babies with autism
develop a different way of processing sensory information, which
in turn defines the way that they interact with the environment
and hence determines what it is that they build their experiences
on. This leads to the possibility that social world as enacted by
individuals with ASD is most probably quite different from that
enacted by typically developing individuals. This idea emphasizes
the importance of the development of cognition. The develop-
mental approach to understanding cognitive control in ASD pre-
dominantly relies on studies involving children and some studies
involving adults, while studies focusing on elderly with ASD are
rare (Geurts and Vissers, 2012; Happé and Charlton, 2012). As
different studies have shown, capacities in cognitive control vary
across age in typically developing individuals (Cepeda et al., 2001;
Kray et al., 2004; Crone et al., 2006; Davidson et al., 2006). In the
following section, we will therefore address the possible connec-
tions between the development of cognitive control mechanisms
across age in typically developing and in individuals with ASD.
COGNITIVE CONTROL ACROSS AGE
TYPICALLY DEVELOPING INDIVIDUALS
Various studies have examined how the ability to exert control over
our thoughts and actions differs for different age groups in typi-
cally developing individuals (Zelazo et al., 2004; Crone et al., 2006;
Meyer et al., 2010; Washylyshyn et al., 2011; Yeniceri and Altan-
Atalay, 2011) with just a few longitudinal studies so far, a genetic
study (Erickson et al., 2008) and two neuroimaging studies (Finn
et al., 2010; Koolschijn et al., 2011). The idea behind this devel-
opmental approach is based on the observations that different
cognitive control abilities change throughout the life. The change
is usually such that the abilities first improve between infancy
and late adolescence (Luciana and Nelson, 1998; Diamond, 2002;
Zelazo et al., 2004) followed by their deterioration later on in life
(Kray and Lindenberger, 2000; Cepeda et al., 2001; Reimers and
Maylor, 2005).
In a similar fashion, studies on cognitive flexibility as measured
by the WCST have indicated changes in perseverative behavior
across age (for developmental perspective on executive functions
in ASD, see Russo et al., 2007). Despite the consensus on the find-
ing that perseveration decreases with age, the exact age at which
perseveration on the WCST attains adult levels is still under debate:
while some studies have indicated that children exhibit patterns
of behavior on perseverative errors similar to adults by age 10
(Chelune and Baer, 1986; Welsh et al., 1991), other indicate age
14–15 (Crone et al., 2004) or that the perseverative performance
even continues developing into young adulthood (age 21, Huizinga
et al., 2006). The perseverative behavior increases again later in life
(Rhodes, 2004). Older adults usually commit more perseverative
errors than younger adults (Axelrod and Henry, 1992; Fristoe et al.,
1997; Ridderinkhof et al., 2002; but, see Haaland et al., 1987). From
all these studies, it seems that cognitive flexibility as assessed by the
WCST demonstrates an inverted U curve, but that the exact devel-
opment across age is hard to specify as it strongly varies across
different studies.
Task switching literature has also provided rather complex
and often inconsistent age related differences in cognitive control
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capacities. In these studies, a distinction is usually made between
switch costs and mixing costs. Switch costs, as described earlier, are
calculated as a difference in behavior between switch and repeat
trials. Mixing costs, on the other hand, are usually calculated for
task repetitions only, reported as slower responses on repetition
trials under mixed-tasks conditions than under single-task con-
ditions (Los, 1996; Koch et al., 2005; Rubin and Meiran, 2005;
Steinhauser and Hubner, 2005; Poljac et al., 2009). In develop-
mental studies, however, mixing costs are often referred to as global
costs and are calculated as differences in behavior between repe-
titions in single-task conditions and the average of repetition and
switch trials in mixed-tasks conditions. Possibly due to these differ-
ences in definition, varying results have been reported for mixing
costs and their relation to age. When calculated as repetitions only,
some studies have reported no differences across age (Span et al.,
2004; Crone et al., 2006). Crone et al. have, for instance, observed
a stable pattern for mixing costs across their three age groups:
7–8; 10–12; and 20–25 years old. On the contrary, when calculat-
ing mixing costs including switch trials, larger mixing costs are
reported in children than in adults (Cepeda et al., 2001; Kray et al.,
2004; Reimers and Maylor, 2005). Kray et al. have also reported an
inverted U curve for mixing costs, with both children and elderly
exhibiting larger mixing costs than young adults.
Switch costs usually show a stable pattern across age when
general age related slowing is taken into account (Brinley, 1965;
Salthouse et al., 1998; Kray and Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr and
Kliegl, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Reimers and Maylor, 2005), however, not
always (Van Asselen and Ridderinkhof, 2000; Kray et al., 2002). For
instance, Van Asselen and Ridderinkhof reported that older adults
demonstrated significantly greater switch cost than young adults
when task switches were unpredictable but not for the predictable
ones. This suggests that older adults were also able to exhibit simi-
lar cognitive flexibility if they were given an opportunity to prepare
for a task switch (cf. Kramer et al., 1999; Kray and Lindenberger,
2000).
Although the exact turning points into maturation and the
later deterioration of the cognitive control mechanisms involved
in flexible cognition are difficult to specify from the literature so
far, the age related dependences of both perseverative as well as on
switching behavior are evident. Surely, differences in definitions
make it harder to compare different studies. In addition, because
children are often incapable of managing with adult tasks, differ-
ent tasks are used for different ages, making the comparison across
age quite difficult (see Zelazo and Mueller, 2002 for a list of dif-
ferent tasks used to test cognitive control in children). Even more
importantly, however, a question that remains- when it comes to
this part of the literature examining cognitive control in healthy
population- is what exactly is causing the detected age-related dif-
ferences. Crone et al. (2006) have suggested that differences in task
switching behavior across age might arise due to differences in
carry-over effects of S-R associations between trials. According to
Crone and colleagues, younger children might build stronger S-R
associations that lead to a strong bias toward the same response
if the stimulus repeats across trials. In a similar way, Mayr (2001)
suggested that his finding of less flexibility in older adults might
also be due to stronger carry-over effects from previously formed
S-R associations. Interestingly, influences from traces of past tasks
are also shown to influence task performance in individuals with
ASD (Zmigrod et al., 2012). In what follows, we will discuss the
few studies conducted so far on cognitive control development
in ASD.
INDIVIDUALS WITH ASD
Autism spectrum disorders is generally understood as a pervasive,
lifelong condition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). It is
quite surprising then that there have been just a few studies track-
ing the development of cognitive (dis)abilities in ASD and that,
despite the general wealth of research in ASD. One would expect
that any putative explanation of the observed behavioral patterns
specific to ASD, such as difficulties in intentional control or need
for sameness, should be able to account for the (dis)continuities
and that take place across the life span.
The few longitudinal studies on cognitive control in ASD con-
ducted so far have provided empirical evidence for a stable deficit
in flexibility. For instance, Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994, Experi-
ment 1) have reported in their 3-year follow-up study that while
the control group of adolescents with learning disability showed
a reduction in perseverative behavior on the WCST, concomitant
improvements were not evident in adolescents with ASD. Using
spatial reversal task that also measures perseverative behavior,
Griffith et al. (1999) reported similar stable perseverative behav-
ior in preschoolers with ASD within the space of 1 year. Also a
more recent longitudinal study conducted by Pellicano (2010)
confirmed that children with ASD were impaired in their cog-
nitive flexibility relative to their matched controls at both time
points that the testing occurred. These studies demonstrated a
rather stable perseverative behavior, implying that there might
be a ceiling on the extent to which such cognitive abilities can
develop in individuals with ASD. Pellicano has, however, provided
evidence that higher-order planning – measured by the ToL task –
improved significantly more in children with ASD than in the
typically developing controls. This finding implies that although
deficits in cognitive flexibility seem to show a stable pattern over
the development in individuals with ASD, some other cognitive
functions that are also important for behavioral control might
change with age.
More developmental studies are evidently needed to be able to
specify how this developmental and lifelong disorder manifests in
behavior across the life span. For instance, more studies involv-
ing elderly with ASD would generally be desirable (cf. Geurts and
Vissers, 2012; Happé and Charlton, 2012). More specifically, stud-
ies are needed that would help us determine the age at which
we can start differentiating between cognitive control capacities
in typically developing and individuals with ASD (for early brain
development in ASD, see Courchesne et al., 2007). Also studies
specifying further development of the detected cognitive con-
trol deviations would be valuable for our better understanding
of autism. It would for instance be interesting to see how both
cognitive flexibility and higher-order planning are reflected in
behavior of elderly with ASD.
An interesting parallel to consider would be to investigate
how action control and planning are affected by age in ASD.
Some recent developmental studies have indicated a substantial
improvement in interactive action control in typically developing
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children between the age of 2.5 and 3 (Meyer et al., 2010). Specifi-
cally, while 3-years old children were able to demonstrate a pattern
similar to adults for both individual and joint actions, children of
2.5 demonstrated less accurate performance when acting jointly
with an adult partner. Considering the fact that individuals with
ASD show problems in social interactions – for instance, under-
standing emotions of others (Dapretto et al., 2006; Ebisch et al.,
2010) and collaborative engagement seem to be impaired in chil-
dren with ASD (Carpenter et al., 2005; Tomasello et al., 2005) – it
would be interesting to test if we can specify the age at which these
problems are reflected in behavior and how these further develop
throughout their life.
Finally, if future studies empirically confirm deficits at the level
of intention establishment in ASD, it would be interesting to see
if any developmental component could be related to impulsive,
compulsive, and apathetic behavior often reported in individuals
with ASD. It is plausible to expect that a cognitive system lacking
intentional control would be a system, in which most of the (exter-
nal and internal) stimulation is being processed. In other words,
it would be a system that impulsively responds to any incom-
ing stimulus. As we know that our brain is highly plastic (for a
recent review, see Zimmerman and Lahav, 2012), we would expect
that, during the development, the brain would compensate for this
overload on information. A possible way to do so is by focusing
on a single, highly preferred intention, a strategy that might result
in behavioral compulsivity. The brain might perhaps even over-
compensate, resulting in a system that is predominantly shut to the
most of the stimulation, such is the case in apathy. We would expect
that impulsivity, compulsivity, and apathy are interrelated and fol-
low each other across the development of the brain of individuals
with ASD as adaptive compensations to the differently wired brain
from the start on (cf. Klin et al., 2003).
CONCLUSION
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED SO FAR?
In this review, we summarize and critically reflect on behavioral
findings and their theoretical explanations regarding cognitive
control processing in autism, also from a developmental per-
spective. The specific focus of this review is the recent evidence
of deficits in intentional control – a specific subset of cognitive
control processes that biases the choice of our behavioral goals –
coming from different research fields. We relate this evidence to
the cognitive rigidity observed in ASD and argue that individuals
with ASD experience problems at intentional level rather than at
the level of the implementation of intentions. Both these processes
are related to cognitive control mechanisms but in different ways.
Finally, we discuss new directions in studying cognitive control in
ASD and how these relate to adaptive cognition.
This review focuses on cognitive control impairments in ASD.
We conclude from the literature we have summarized and dis-
cussed that although the deficits in cognitive control in individ-
uals with ASD have received a considerable amount of empirical
support at the behavioral level, the specific neurocognitive mech-
anisms behind the observed behavioral deviations are still heavily
debated. One of the challenges we need to address is the observa-
tion that the behavior of individuals with ASD in the lab often dif-
fers from that observed in real-life or in clinical settings. This is for
instance the case with cognitive flexibility in ASD – while behav-
ioral rigidity is evident in their daily lives, testing the assumed
difficulties in cognitive flexibility in ASD by means of task switch-
ing paradigms provides hardly any empirical evidence (Geurts
et al., 2009). First steps in addressing this challenge are already
set by providing a more detailed description: while complex neu-
ropsychological tests are predominantly ambiguous in their output
demands and are hence open to various interpretations of the
required behavior, the more controlled experimental settings are
quite precise in their behavioral demands (Lawson, 2003). The
reported difficulties with neuropsychological tests would accord-
ing to this view reflect the tendency of individuals with ASD to
approach the world in a more strictly defined relation between
internal and external input and their responding to the same (cf.
Klin et al., 2003). Finally, we elaborate on this observation and
highlight the possibility that individuals with ASD predominantly
exhibit problems with tasks of an open character rather than in
tasks that are clearly defined due to their deficits in intentional
control. Specifically, the idea we put forward in this review is that
cognitive control deficits in ASD are generated at the level of inten-
tional rather than executional processing. Deficits in intentional
control would go together with difficulties in adaptive behavior,
which is typically observed in individuals with ASD.
IS COGNITIVE CONTROL APPROACH A PROMISING WAY TO FOLLOW
Clinical and behavioral studies have predominated the research
on ASD for quite some time (cf. Hill and Frith, 2003; Frith and
Happé, 2005), possibly encouraged by the fact that its diagnostic
criteria as described in DSM IV are based on behavioral expres-
sion of this neurodevelopmental disorder (see e.g., Robbins et al.,
2012 for a critical view on DSM IV). The recent increase in neu-
roimaging (for review, see Belger et al., 2011; Philip et al., 2012) and
genetic (for review, see Eigsti and Shapiro, 2003; Geschwind, 2011)
studies has certainly significantly contributed to our knowledge of
ASD – we know now that the mechanisms behind the observed
deviant behavioral patterns are not related to straightforward gene
deviations or a simple brain deficit.
The complete understanding of ASD will obviously require a
better understanding of how genetic risk variants lead to changes
in neural circuitry and function and their expression in covert
and overt behavior. From the cognitive approach, the challenge
is to relate specific deficits at the brain level, via more general
descriptions at a cognitive level (i.e., cognitive control impair-
ments) to the reported behavioral differences (Frith, 1998, 2012).
Specifically, cognitive control deficits as expressed in behavior of
individuals with ASD need further specification at the level of
neurocognitive mechanisms. This review concludes that within
the proposed theoretical approach of executive dysfunctions, a
more precisely defied approach needs to be offered if we are
to take the challenge of specifying the individuals within the
ASD population at the genotype and phenotype level in more
detail.
We propose here that a promising way to follow would be to
systematically explore the recently reported indication of deficits
in cognitive control in ASD at the level of higher-order inten-
tions, coming both from research field on cognitive flexibility
(task switching studies) and on action (perception-action studies).
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Finally, studies that would systematically compare intentional con-
trol deficits in ASD with intentional deficits reported in other neu-
ropsychological disorders – such as schizophrenia and GTS – are
desirable and interesting as they might reveal if these disorders
may share some underlying cognitive mechanisms with ASD.
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